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OPTIMAL STOPPING IN A TWO-SIDED SECRETARY
PROBLEM
KIMMO ERIKSSON, JONAS SJO¨STRAND, AND PONTUS STRIMLING
Abstract. In the ”secretary problem,” well-known in the theory
of optimal stopping, an employer is about to interview a maximum
of N secretaries about which she has no prior information. Chow
et al. proved that with an optimal strategy the expected rank of
the chosen secretary tends to
∏
∞
k=1(1 +
2
k )
1/(k+1) ≈ 3.87.
We study a two-sided game-theoretic version of this optimal
stopping problem, where men search for a woman to marry at the
same time as women search for a man to marry. We find that in
the unique subgame perfect equilibrium, the expected rank grows
as
√
N and that, surprisingly, the leading coefficient is exactly 1.
We also discuss some possible variations.
1. Introduction
Amathematical result of such general appeal that it sometimes appears
in ordinary newspapers (such as The Independent [4]) is the ”37 %
rule.” This rule states that if you are walking down a one-way street of
restaurants of which you have no knowledge beforehand and you have
decided that, no matter what, you will pick the hundredth restaurant
if you haven’t picked one before that, then you should walk by 37
restaurants and then pick the first one that you like better than all the
previous restaurants. This rule is optimal in the sense that you will
maximize your chance of picking the best of the hundred restaurants.
1.1. The secretary problem. Although the restaurant setting may
be the one most pertinent to every-day life, the problem has become
known as the secretary problem in the mathematics literature. In-
stead of a hungry tourist judging restaurants, you are now an employer
interviewing candidates for a position as your secretary. After each in-
terview you must decide whether to hire this candidate or continue the
search process, in which case you cannot return to this candidate. If
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for some reason you will look at N candidates at most, then you should
never hire among the first N/e candidates and then hire the first one
that you like better than all the previous ones. Since 1/e ≈ 0.37, this
is the 37 % rule. The history of the secretary problem has been nicely
told by Ferguson [7].
The secretary problem is the prime example of a question of optimal
stopping. The theory of optimal stopping was treated in a comprehen-
sive way more than thirty years ago by Chow, Robbins and Siegmund
[3], and more recently by Ferguson [6]. Our inspiration to the fol-
lowing piece of research came from a short paper by Steven Finch on
mathematical constants from optimal stopping [8]. After mentioning
the secretary problem and its constant 1/e, Finch continues with the
following much less known variation, which is not treated in either of
the above-mentioned books: What is the optimal stopping strategy if
you want to minimize the expected rank RN of the chosen secretary?
(The N candidates are ranked so that the best one has rank 1, the
second-best has rank 2, etc.) Lindley [10] found an optimal strategy,
and Chow et al. [2] proved that using this strategy the expected rank
RN tends to a constant as N tends to infinity:
lim
N→∞
RN =
∞∏
k=1
(
1 +
2
k
)1/(k+1)
≈ 3.87
We found this result doubly amazing — not only does it defy intuition
that even with millions of candidates we can expect to end up with
the fourth-best just by using a stopping rule, but it also seems unlikely
that the constant could be expressed on such a closed form.
1.2. A two-sided secretary problem. The article in The Indepen-
dent on the 37 % rule was based on an interview with Peter Todd, a
psychologist working on social heuristics, i.e. behavioral rules of thumb.
By laboratory experiments as well as computer simulations, Todd and
Miller [13, 5] have investigated simple heuristics for mate search where
both sexes have the possibility of saying no to a partner. Mate search
can therefore be described as a two-sided secretary problem. There are
several natural variants of the exact specification. However, we have
been unable to find any previous mathematical treatment of any variant
of the two-sided secretary problem in the optimal stopping literature.
In this paper we are most interested in the following game theoretic
setting of the problem. There is a large universe of U men and U
women. Every woman has a personal total preference order on the
men, and vice versa. In other words, for each woman w there is a
permutation of the set of men representing her personal rank order,
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and similarly for each man. The preferences are unknown, only to be
partially revealed through extensive dating. Each of these persons are
willing to search for a mate for a maximum ofN rounds, whereN << U
(think of N in the tens or hundreds, and U in the billions). In each
round every woman will date a new man, and they can either agree
on marrying (and leave the game) or at least one of them decides not
to marry, in which case they proceed to the next round and will never
date each other again. In the Nth round, the players have no other
option than marrying. The condition that N << U will guarantee that
all players can count on new partners being available for all N rounds,
even though most will leave the game before the last round.
Now, where do the permutations come from? We make the usual
assumption in the secretary problem that each permutation is drawn
randomly among all possible permutations. We also assume that a
random choice determines who will date who in each round (among all
unseen partners still available). This means that from the viewpoint
of any player entering round r, the rank of the next date relative the
r − 1 partners already observed is a random variable drawn from a
uniform distribution on the set of ranks from 1 to r. Let us call this
the next-player principle.
Finally, what is the goal of the players? It is not very meaningful to
maximize the probability of marrying the top-ranked mate, since the
player will only ever see a very small portion of the universe, N out of
U . Instead, as in Lindley’s variant of the secretary problem [10, 2] we
assume that each player wants to minimize the expected rank of the
mate among the N partners the player would meet if she completed
all N rounds. Although the actual set of partners that a player would
have met is not determined if she does not play the whole game, the
expected rank can be computed by a simple formula that follows by
induction from the next-player principle:
RN(r, Rr) =
N + 1
r + 1
Rr,
where RN is the expected rank in round N of our current date in round
r, ranked Rr among the r partners observed up to then. When several
rank concepts are thrown around simultaneously, we will refer to this
as the N-rank.
A strategy in this two-sided secretary game is a rule that says whether
to propose marriage in round r to a date of observed rank Rr. Re-
member that the player cannot be certain that the date will agree on
marrying. (If players on the other side always agree, then we would be
back in the one-sided secretary problem.)
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1.3. A cooperative problem. To begin with, we can take the view-
point of cooperative game theory where players can make a binding
agreement to play a certain strategy.
Problem 1. If the players can make a binding agreement beforehand
on a common strategy, what is the optimal choice? What is the expected
N-rank under this strategy?
In this case the problem is a pure optimization problem of finding the
strategy on which to agree. Given every player’s strategy, the N -rank
RN(r) a player can expect when she enters round r can be computed
by the following recurrence:
(1) RN (r) = P [marry]·N + 1
r + 1
·E[Rr|marry]+(1−P [marry])·RN(r+1).
The boundary condition is RN(N) = (N +1)/2 since at the last round
each player can expect to obtain an average partner. As before, Rr
denotes the rank of your current date among the r partners you have
seen. We desire to compute RN (1), the expected N -rank when we enter
the game.
We have not solved Problem 1 completely, but we will motivate the
following conjecture which defines a new optimal stopping constant:
Conjecture 2. In the cooperative two-sided secretary game, the asymp-
totics of the expected N-rank when entering the game is given by
lim
N→∞
RN (1)√
N
=
√
27/32 ≈ 0.92.
1.4. A noncooperative problem. Now switch to the noncoopera-
tive version of the game, where each player tries to optimize her own
outcome.
Problem 3. What is the optimal strategy in the noncooperative two-
sided secretary game, and what is the expected N-rank under this strat-
egy?
In noncooperative game theory, a strategy can only be optimal given
the strategies of the other players. If each player plays a strategy that
is optimal given the strategies of everybody else, then we have a Nash
equilibrium. A common problem in game theory is that there exist very
many Nash equilibria (such as ”always marry in the first round”). The
solution proposed by Selten [12] is to assume that perfectly rational
players will coordinate on a subgame perfect equilibrium, that is, an
equilibrium where all players’ strategies are optimal in every possible
subgame. In the two-sided secretary game, finding the unique subgame
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perfect equilibrium is a recursive optimization problem: In the last
round, every player will accept marriage since it is always preferable
to not marrying at all; in the next to last round, a player will want
to marry if her current date is better than what she would expect to
obtain in the last round, etc. We refer to this as the optimal strategy,
which will be the same for all players.
In this case we have been able to solve the problem completely. The
answer is surprisingly simple.
Theorem 4. In the noncooperative two-sided secretary game, the asymp-
totics of the expected N-rank when entering the game is given by
lim
N→∞
RN(1)/
√
N = 1.
This is our main result.
1.5. The two-sided secretary problem with universal rank sym-
metry. Due to the risk of rejections from good partners, each player
in the two-sided game is at a clear disadvantage compared to an em-
ployer in a one-sided secretary problem. This phenomenon is inherent
to two-sidedness, but it is reasonable to ask how small the disadvan-
tage can be made if preferences are dependent on each other so that
the probability of you liking me increases if I like you.
An extreme case in this direction is universal rank symmetry. By
this we mean that each woman w and man m have the same universal
rankings of each other, so that if m is ranked by w as the Rth best
man in the universe, then w is ranked by m as the Rth best woman
in the universe. (In combinatorial terms, the women’s permutations
of the men constitute a U × U Latin square since no two women can
give the same rank to the same man. The women’s Latin square then
uniquely determines the men’s Latin square.)
Problem 5. What is the optimal strategy in the two-sided secretary
game with universal rank symmetry, and what is the expected N-rank
under this strategy?
We conjecture that universal rank symmetry radically changes the
outcome, so that the expected N -rank tends to a small constant:
Conjecture 6. In the two-sided secretary game with universal rank
symmetry, the asymptotics of the expected N-rank when entering the
game is given by
lim
N→∞
RN(1) = constant < 5.
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1.6. Outline of paper. We will work through the problems in the
above order, starting with our partial solution to the cooperative ver-
sion. We will then treat the noncooperative problem in the same way,
but here we have been able to compute the asymptotics using a method
inspired by Chow et al. [2]. After partially treating the case of universal
rank symmetry, we conclude with some discussion and open problems.
2. Problem 1: The optimal strategy under binding
agreement
Let us assume that the players agree on a strategy, i.e. a set of thresh-
olds s1, s2, . . . , sN−1 together with the rule that you must propose
marriage to your date in round r if and only if his observed rank sat-
isfies Rr ≤ sr. Without loss of generality we can always choose the
threshold sr to be an integer between 0 and r. Then, according to the
next-player principle, the probability that you will propose in round r
is sr/r. Hence, the probability of an agreement to marry is
P [marry] =
(sr
r
)2
,
and the expected observed rank of your partner, given that you propose,
is
E[Rr|marry] = sr + 1
2
.
We can plug these expressions into the fundamental recurrence (1).
Setting n = N − r (the number of rounds remaining) and setting ρn =
RN(N − n) · 2/(N + 1), the recurrence takes the shape
(2) ρn =
(
sN−n
N − n
)2
· sN−n + 1
N − n + 1 +
(
1−
(
sN−n
N − n
)2)
· ρn−1,
with boundary condition ρ0 = 1. We want to minimize ρN−1. All
factors and terms are nonnegative, so for each n from 1 to N − 1 we
simply want to agree on the threshold sN−n that will minimize ρn. To
find this threshold, differentiate the expression and find the zero to be
sN−n = 23(−1 + (N − n + 1) · ρn−1). Then adjust the threshold to the
closest integer between 0 and r. For example, setting n = 1 we see that
in the next-to-last round we shall propose if our current date is among
the best two thirds of all partners we have seen.
For n << N we obtain the approximative recurrence
ρn ≈ ρn−1 − 4
27
ρ3n−1, ρ0 = 1.
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Making the ansatz ρn = A · (n+B)C and approximating the difference
ρn − ρn−1 by the derivative, we obtain the solution ρn =
√
27/8 · (n +
4)−1/2.
In the unlikely event that this crude approximation works all the
way for n = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1, then a player’s expected N -rank when en-
tering the game would be RN(1) =
N+1
2
ρN−1 ≈
√
27N/32. Amazingly,
computer calculations seem to vindicate that limN→∞RN(1)/
√
N ≈
0.92 ≈√27/32, see the graph in Figure 1.
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x 104
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Figure 1. The graph of RN(1)/
√
N for the two-sided
secretary game under optimal binding agreement.
To summarize this section: We have found a recurrence giving the
optimal strategy under cooperation, and we conjecture that the asymp-
totic behavior is given by limN→∞RN (1)/
√
N =
√
27/32. It is possible
that this problem might yield to the same method that we use in the
next section.
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3. Problem 2: The optimal noncooperative strategy
The strategy on which the players agreed in the previous section is
not a Nash equilibrium. This is obvious from the observation that
in the next-to-last round all players agreed to propose to any partner
among the best two thirds, while a rational player who is not under
any binding agreement would not accept a partner worse than average,
since she would expect an average partner in the last round.
The thresholds that define the subgame perfect equilibrium strategy
in this noncooperative case are determined by what you can expect to
get if you decline to marry. You should accept marriage in round r if
and only if the expected N -rank if you marry now is less than or equal
to the expected N -rank if you do not marry:
N + 1
r + 1
· Rr ≤ RN (r + 1),
and the threshold sr should be the largest integer value of Rr satisfying
the above inequality, so that
sr = ⌊ r + 1
N + 1
· RN (r + 1)⌋.
We can assume all other players to reason in the same way, so that we
have P [marry] = (sr/r)
2 as in the previous section. Consequently, we
can just plug this new value of sr into the recurrence (2). The same
approximations now yield
ρn ≈ ρn−1 − 1
8
ρ3n−1, ρ0 = 1,
with an approximate solution of ρn = 2(n+ 4)
−1/2. As in the coopera-
tive case, the validity of this approximation is supported by computer
calculations indicating that
lim
N→∞
RN(1)/
√
N = 1.
This is our Theorem 4. We will prove this result using the same ap-
proach as Chow et al. [2], although we will encounter different technical
difficulties than they did.
3.1. Proof of Theorem 4. For convenience, introduce i = r − 1 (so
that the range is i = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1) and ci = RN(i + 1). We wish to
prove that c0/
√
N → 1. Define the unrounded threshold
ti =
i+ 1
N + 1
· ci,
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so that si = ⌊ti⌋. Then recurrence (1) can be rewritten as
(3) ti−1 =
s2i (si + 1) + 2(i
2 − s2i )ti
2i(i+ 1)
; tN−1 =
N
2
.
For any i, define αi = ti − si. Then 0 ≤ αi < 1, and (3) becomes
(4) ti−1 =
(ti − αi)2(ti − αi + 1) + 2(i2 − (ti − αi)2)ti
2i(i+ 1)
.
It is trivial to see that aiti + (1− αi)[t2i + αi(ti − αi)] ≥ 0. If we add
this number to the nominator of (4) we obtain the upper bound
(5) ti−1 ≤ Ti(ti) def= −t
3
i + 2t
2
i + 2i
2ti
2i(i+ 1)
.
Similarly, if we subtract αi[(ti − 1)2 + αi(ti − αi)] + (ti − αi) + α2i ≥ 0
from the nominator of (4) we obtain the lower bound
(6) ti−1 ≥ τi(ti) def= −t
3
i + t
2
i + (2i
2 − 1)ti
2i(i+ 1)
.
It is easy to show that, if i ≥ 2, the functions Ti(t) and τi(t) are
both increasing for all t in the range [0,
√
2/3i], and that this interval
includes all values t can possibly attain, so we can use these recursive
inequalities in order to prove explicit lower and upper bounds.
Lemma 7. Let f(N) be any real function with limN→∞ f(N) = ∞.
For sufficiently large N the upper bound
ti ≤ i+
√
i√
N − i+ 3 ,
holds for all i in the interval f(N) ≤ i ≤ N − 1.
Proof. Proof by backwards induction. The lemma holds for i = N − 1,
since
tN−1 = N/2 ≤ N − 1 +
√
N − 1√
4
for all N ≥ 2. Assuming the lemma holds for a given i we have
ti−1 ≤ Ti(ti) ≤ Ti
( i+√i√
N − i+ 3
)
,
thanks to (5) and the fact that Ti is an increasing function. Hence, to
conclude the induction step we only need to prove that
Ti
( i+√i√
N − i+ 3
) ≤ i− 1 +√i− 1√
N − i+ 4 .
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This can be verified through several steps of computations in Maple
(see Appendix). 
The lower bound is trickier. We have not been able to find a lower
bound for which the induction step works, but by adding a constant
term of 0.148 to the denominator we obtain a lower bound that works
from N − 22 and downwards.
Lemma 8. For sufficiently large N , the lower bound
ti ≥ i+ 1√
N − i+ 3 + 0.148
holds for all i in the interval
√
N + 1 ≤ i ≤ N − 22.
Proof. For large N we can compute an approximation of tN−22 by using
the recurrence 21 steps, keeping only the most significant term in each
step: If tN−k = akN + o(N) we have sN−k = akN + o(N) too, so our
recurrence (3) gives tN−k−1 =
−a3k+2ak
2
N + o(N). Maple gives
tN−22 ≈ 0.19427N ≥ 0.19425N − 4.07925 = (N − 22) + 1√
22 + 3 + 0.148
.
Again we proceed by backwards induction. Assuming the lemma holds
for a given i we have
ti−1 ≥ τi(ti) ≥ τi
(
i+ 1√
N − i+ 3 + 0.148
)
,
thanks to (6) and the fact that τi is an increasing function. It remains
for us to prove that
τi
(
i+ 1√
N − i+ 3 + 0.148
)
≥ i√
N − i+ 4 + 0.148
for large N . Again, several steps in Maple verifies this inequality, see
Appendix. 
We are now in a position to finish the proof of Theorem 4. In the
case ti < 1 we always have si = 0 so no partners are ever accepted and
the expected N -rank ci remains constant down to c0. Let icrit be the
greatest i with ti < 1, so that c0 = c1 = · · · = cicrit.
Lemma 8 gives that, for large N ,
t⌈√N+1⌉ ≥
⌈√N + 1⌉+ 1√
N − ⌈√N + 1⌉+ 3 + 0.148
> 1
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so icrit <
√
N + 1. Lemma 7 with f(N) = N1/2 −N1/3 gives, for large
N ,
t⌈N1/2−N1/3⌉ ≤
⌈N1/2 −N1/3⌉+
√
⌈N1/2 −N1/3⌉√
N − ⌈N1/2 −N1/3⌉+ 3
=
√
N − 2N5/6 + o(N5/6)
N −N1/2 + o(N1/2) < 1
so icrit + 1 ≥ N1/2 −N1/3.
Since N1/2 − N1/3 ≤ icrit + 1 <
√
N + 2, Lemma 7 with f(N) =
N1/2 −N1/3 gives that
1 ≤ ticrit+1 ≤
icrit + 1 +
√
icrit + 1√
N − icrit + 2
≤
√
N + 2 +
√√
N + 2√
N −√N + 1
→ 1
as N →∞. Then sicrit+1 = 1, and by (3) we get ticrit → 1.
Recall that, by definition, ti = ci(i + 1)/(N + 1) so that cicrit =
ticrit(N + 1)/(icrit + 1). Thus, we have
c0√
N
=
cicrit√
N
=
N + 1
icrit + 1
· ticrit√
N
→ 1
since ticrit → 1 and N1/2 −N1/3 − 1 ≤ icrit <
√
N + 1.
3.2. A social dilemma. This game illustrates the game-theoretic con-
cept of a social dilemma. All players would like to agree on the cooper-
ative strategy, where you accept to marry quite a lot of partners for the
good of the group. However, when an individual player finds herself
in a position where the strategy calls on her to marry a date that she
finds below her expectations, she is tempted to reject this partner and
optimize her own good instead. But if all players do that, then the
expected outcome is worse for all of them; for large N the expected
change for the worse is about 8 percent.
4. Problem 3: The optimal strategy under universal rank
symmetry
If the preferences of all players satisfy universal rank symmetry, then it
should be easier for the players to find mutually acceptable agreements.
As in the previous problem, a rational player will accept a partner
in round r if the observed rank does not exceed the threshold sr =
⌊ r+1
N+1
· RN(r + 1)⌋. The new circumstance in the current setting is
that the events ”your observed rank of me is at most sr” and ”my
observed rank of you is at most sr” are no longer independent. Hence
the probability P [marry] = P [both ranks ≤ sr] must be found by
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other means. Integration over the unknown global rank, which is the
same for both players, yields
(7) P [marry] =
sr−1∑
k=0
sr−1∑
ℓ=0
(
r−1
k
)(
r−1
ℓ
)
(
2(r−1)
k+ℓ
)
(2r − 1)
Similarly, the expected rank of a partner given the fact that you both
agree to marry is no longer given by the arithmetic mean in the rank
interval [1, sr] but is more favorable:
(8) E[Rr|marry] = r
sr
sr−1∑
k=0
(k + 1)
(
r − 1
k
) sr−1∑
ℓ=0
(
r−1
ℓ
)
(
2(r−1)
k+ℓ
)
(2r − 1)
The recurrence resulting from plugging these expressions into (1) de-
termines the optimal strategy under universal rank symmetry.
We have not yet been able to find the limit of the expected N -rank in
this case, but computer calculations indicate that it approaches a small
constant (less than 5). Thus, making the preferences dependent of each
other in this way seems to have changed the behavior of the expected
rank so that it resembles the behavior in the one-sided problem.
5. Discussion and open problems
For now, we have to leave our conjectures of the asymptotic behavior
of the expected N -rank in Problem 1 and 3 as open problems. Another
open problem is to find the optimal strategy when the universe is small,
U = N , so that you do not know during a date whether there will be
any more dates or if all possible partners will already be married if
you reject the one you are currently entertaining. In this case, another
reasonable version is obtained if we lift the restriction on dating the
same person twice so that in each round one would simply select a
random date among all remaining unmarried players of the opposite
sex.
In the context of the two-sided secretary problem, it is reasonable
to briefly discuss the theory of stable matching, pioneered by Gale and
Shapley [9] and later comprehensively treated by Roth and Sotomayor
[11]. Also this theory studies men and women who have preferences on
each other. The difference is that the stable matching theory assumes
that each player knows all her preferences in advance, while in the
secretary problem the preferences are only revealed slowly as the player
meets new potential partners. On the other hand, in the secretary
problem we have no guarantees that the marriages will be stable when
new partners are met later in life. It would be interesting to study some
measure of how stable these marriages will be under various conditions.
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In a recent study, Caldarelli and Capocci [1] have studied stable mar-
riages under the assumption that people’s preferences are influenced by
a commonly appreciated trait such as beauty. They find that this con-
dition favors the very beautiful players while all others are worse off
than in a world where preferences are random. Universal rank sym-
metry is an assumption in the opposite direction. True preferences are
likely to reflect a mixture of randomness, a common sense of beauty,
and an ”I-like-you-if-you-like-me” component like our universal rank
symmetry. Modelling such sets of permutations is a challenge to com-
binatorialists.
Appendix
Here we prove two lemmas that are needed in the proof of Theorem 4.
Lemma 9. Let f(N) be any real function with limN→∞ f(N) = ∞.
Then, for sufficiently large N , the inequality
Ti
( i+√i√
N − i+ 3
) ≤ i− 1 +√i− 1√
N − i+ 4
holds for all f(N) ≤ i ≤ N − 1.
Proof. After the substitution z =
√
N − i+ 3 our inequality transforms
to
(9) Ti
( i+√i
z
) ≤ i− 1 +√i− 1√
z2 + 1
and the condition i ≤ N − 1 transforms to z ≥ 2. We will prove that
the inequality (9) holds for z ≥ 1 and sufficiently large i. A large N
implies a large i since f(N) ≤ i, so the lemma will follow.
Evaluating Ti in (9) yields
g(i, z)
def
=
i− 1 +√i− 1√
z2 + 1
− −
(i+
√
i)3
z3
+ 2(i+
√
i)2
z2
+ 2i
2(i+
√
i)
z
2i(i+ 1)
> 0.
We see that
g(i, 1) = (
√
2− 1)i3 + i5/2 + (
√
2(i− 1) + 1)(i2 + i)− 3i3/2 − (2 +
√
2)i
which is positive for large i. Since g(i, z) is continuous it suffices to
show that g(i, z) 6= 0 for z ≥ 1 and i large. The zeros of g(i, z) are the
same as the zeros of(
i− 1 +√i− 1√
z2 + 1
)2
−
(
− (i+
√
i)3
z3
+ 2(i+
√
i)2
z2
+ 2i
2(i+
√
i)
z
2i(i+ 1)
)2
.
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We multiply this by (2i(i + 1))2(z2 + 1)z6 and obtain a polynomial of
degree 6 in z:
q(z)
def
= 4(2(i5 + i4 − i3 − i2)√i− 1− 2i11/2 − i4 − i3)z6
− 8(i5 + 3i9/2 + 3i4 + i7/2)z5
+ 4(2i11/2 + 5i5 + 4i9/2 − 4i7/2 − 6i3 − 4i5/2 − i2)z4
+ 4(−i5 − i9/2 + 4i4 + 8i7/2 + 5i3 + i5/2)z3
+ (3i6 + 10i11/2 + 9i5 − 4i9/2 − 15i4 − 22i7/2 − 25i3 − 16i5/2 − 4i2)z2
+ 4(i5 + 5i9/2 + 10i4 + 10i7/2 + 5i3 + i5/2)z
− (i6 + 6i11/2 + 15i5 + 20i9/2 + 15i4 + 6i7/2 + i3)
We must show that q(z) 6= 0 for z ≥ 1 and i large. Using a computer
program like Maple this is just a matter of verification:
• Compute the fourth derivative q(4)(z) = a2(i)z2+a1(i)z+a0(i).
• Verify that
(
a1(i)
2a2(i)
)2
− a0(i)
a2(i)
< 0 for large i. This implies that
q(4)(z) has no real roots.
• Check that q(4)(0) > 0 for large i so that q(4)(z) > 0 everywhere.
This is immediately evident from the expression for q(z) above.
• Check that q′′′(1), q′′(1), q′(1), and q(1) are positive for large i.
This shows that q(z) > 0 for all z ≥ 1 for sufficiently large i. 
Lemma 10. For sufficiently large N , the inequality
τi
( i+ 1√
N − i+ 3 + 0.148
) ≥ i√
N − i+ 4 + 0.148
holds for all i in the interval
√
N + 1 ≤ i ≤ N − 22.
Proof. Put ε = 0.148. After the substitution z =
√
N − i+ 3 + ε our
inequality transforms to
(10) τi
( i+ 1
z
) ≥ i√
(z − ε)2 + 1 + ε.
The interval
√
N + 1 ≤ i ≤ N − 22 transforms to
(11) 5 ≤ z − ε ≤
√
(i− 1)2 − i+ 3.
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Evaluating τi in (10) and multiplying by 2iz
3(
√
(z − ε)2 + 1 + ε) > 0
yields
p(i)
def
= ((2z2 − 1)
√
(z − ε)2 + 1− (2z3 + (1− 2z2)ε))i2
+ ((z − 2)(
√
(z − ε)2 + 1 + ε)i
− (z2 − z + 1)(
√
(z − ε)2 + 1 + ε)
≥ 0,
a quadratic polynomial in i.
Let us first show that the leading coefficient of p(i) is positive, i. e.
(2z2 − 1)
√
(z − ε)2 + 1 > 2z3 + (1− 2z2)ε.
After squaring, expanding, and collecting we get 4εz3−3z2−2εz+1 >
0. The zeros of this third-degree polynomial in z are z1 ≈ −0.592,
z2 ≈ 0.559, and z3 ≈ 5.100, all of which are less than 5 + ε.
There are always real roots to p(i) since its constant term is negative
for z ≥ 5+ε. For each z, let i(z) be the greater of the two roots of p(i).
We can, of course, write down an explicit formula for i(z) and with a
computer program like Maple it is easy to check that limz→∞ i(z)−z =
1 − ε. Thus, for any δ > 0 there is a Zδ such that p(i) > 0 for
i > z + 1− ε+ δ for all z > Zδ. We choose δ = 1/4. In the interesting
interval (11) we have z + 1 − ε + 1/4 ≤ √(i− 1)2 − i+ 3 + 3/4 < i,
where the last inequality follows from (i−1)2− i+3 < (i−3/4)2 which
is true if i ≥ 3.
In the interval Z1/4 < z ≤ ε+
√
(i− 1)2 − i+ 3 we know that p(i) >
0 so we only have to worry about the interval 5 + ε ≤ z ≤ Z1/4. Since
i(z) is a continuous function we can define I = sup{i(z) : 5 + ε ≤
z ≤ Z1/4}. Then p(i) > 0 in the interval (11) for all i > I. A large N
implies a large i since
√
N + 1 ≤ i, so the lemma follows. 
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